25X1

8 September 1975

WORKING DRAFT

LONG RANGE PERSPECTIVE

FOR INTELLIGENCE: 1980-1990

# Approved For Release 2054/10/28: EIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

#### PREFACE

The Long Range Perspective for Intelligence: 1980-90 is intended to be an integral part of the National Foreign Intelligence Planning Process. At the policy level the Planning Process consists of the following documents:

|                                     | Years |
|-------------------------------------|-------|
| Current Objectives and KIQs         | 1 -   |
| DCID 1/2 - Mid Range<br>Priorities, |       |
| Perspectives                        | · 5   |
| Long Range Perspective              | 15    |

The Long Range Perspective for Intelligence: 1980-90 is to be used as a basis for those sections of the Functional Plans (i.e., SIGINT, Imagery, HUMINT, Production and R&D) that deal with long range plans and strategies. The Functional Plans are to include implications for resource planning based, in part, on the contents of this document.

The long range sections from the Functional Plans will contribute to the next iteration of the Long Range Perspective for Intelligence.

This document consists of a long range view of the 1980-90 time frame by country/region and subject. It also contains a listing of the principal events for the 1980's and a series of possible but unpredictable turning points.

Judgments about the future were derived, in part, from numerous publications by leading authors in the futures field, a long range document prepared in CIA and DoD long range planning documents.

# Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5 **SECRET**

### CONTENTS

| INTRODUC | CTION  |       |      | •   | •    |          | • •  | •   | •   | •   | • | •   | • | • | •   | • | • | 1    |
|----------|--------|-------|------|-----|------|----------|------|-----|-----|-----|---|-----|---|---|-----|---|---|------|
| 1980-90  | PERSI  | ECTI  | VE   | ВҮ  | cou  | NTRY     | /REC | SIO | N   | •   | • | •   | • | • | •   | • | • | 3    |
| 1980-90  | PERSI  | PECTI | [VE  | ву  | SUB  | JECT     |      | •   | •   | •   | • | • , | • | • | • . | • | • | 1.4  |
| PRINCIPA | AL EVI | ENTS  | IN   | THE | 19   | 80'S     | •    | •   | •   | • . | • | •   |   | • |     | • |   | . 22 |
| POSSIBL  | E BUT  | UNPI  | REDI | CTA | ABLE | TUR      | NINC | 5 P | OIN | ITS | 3 |     |   | • | •   | • | • | .25  |
| REFEREN  | CES .  |       |      |     | :.   | <u>.</u> |      |     |     | •   |   | ••  |   | • |     | • | • | 28   |

# SECRET

#### INTRODUCTION

The Long Range Perspective for Intelligence: 1980-90 is the initial attempt to produce a long range view of the world for use by the U.S. Intelligence Community in planning its future activities.

The basic purpose of identifying a long range view for intelligence planning is to improve today's decisions by looking ahead and taking into account those factors that can affect the direction in which the Intelligence Community This is particularly important when considering the development of advanced systems, many of which require long lead times. Most key intelligence needs of today will probably persist into the 1980's; however, their nature and priorities can be expected to change. Thus, today's needs which drive many intelligence activities do not provide sufficient guidance necessary to stimulate exploration of effective methods of operation in 1980-90 world conditions. The long range view depicted in this document is designed to contribute to making the best possible decisions in today's world based on judgments about the risks and uncertainties of the future.

Qualitative analysis and subjective judgments were the methodological means utilized to develop future trends.

# Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

Some of the trends are linear or intuitive in nature, while others are more radical or counterintuitive. A principal difficulty with estimates of future trends is their credibility. In general, short term trends (i.e., 1 to 5 years) are more believable than longer term trends (i.e., 5 to 15 years). Errors and uncertainties tend to increase as one extrapolates further out into the future, although these uncertainties can be minimized to some degree by employing certain aids to assist us in viewing the future. However, the approach used was not supported by the application of computerized models or other methods for extrapolating into the future, since these techniques require investment in time and effort beyond what was reasonably available for this document.

Sometimes it is claimed that uncertainty is too great and a wait-and-see attitude should be adopted until the situation sorts itself out. Such passive behavior not only forecloses on any possibility of influencing events, but is likely to result in an organization being unprepared when the situation is sorted out. It also denies the reality of the systems development process; decisions are required today on systems which will be our primary collectors five to ten years from now.

# Approved For Releas 2604/19/28 CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

The judgments about future trends are organized by country/region and subject. These judgments are followed by 1) a list of principal events for the 1980's and 2) a listing of certain events (i.e., turning points) which are likely to have an impact in the 1980-90 time frame.

1980-90 PERSPECTIVE BY COUNTRY/REGION

This section and the following one (i.e., 1980-90 PERSPECTIVE BY SUBJECT) describe world trends which are expected to predominate in the 1980's. These trends appear to be influenced primarily by population and food concerns, increasing competition for natural resources, pressures for basic social changes and innovations in weapons, and industrial technology.

## <u>Worldwide</u>

The world of the 1980's is expected to be politically disunited and economically interdependent. Although the US and USSR will continue efforts to avoid major war, the chances of their involvement in regional conflicts will be substantial. Throughout the world proliferating technology is expected to constantly change the distribution of economic and political power.

An important event of the 1980's will relate to the development of power centers. The influence of the US and USSR as today's power centers will tend to diminish in

# Approved For Release 2004/10/28 - CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

relation to that of the developing power centers of Japan, China and Western Europe. The manner in which this power balance changes will influence chances for international stability.

In the 1980's more countries will attempt to achieve national objectives through economic means. The world economy probably will consist of several trading and investment blocs which will have pervasive impact on international power relationships. The gap between rich and poor nations will continue to widen in the 1980's.

The scope and effectiveness of arms controls will continue to be paramount in the 1980's. The prospect of nuclear proliferation will increasingly affect major power relationships. National leaders of certain nations such as Japan, India, Israel, West Germany, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Italy and Australia may decide to go beyond peaceful uses of nuclear energy to military applications. There will be increased concern among the major powers over the purposeful destruction of space satellites.

Broad questions about the utilization of the oceans will continue to engage many nations. Particular attention will be given to the exploitation of ocean floor natural resources and the rights of nations to control coastal ocean areas.

### Approved For Release 2004 1022 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

Of fundamental concern during the 1980's will be the availability of natural resources. The utilization of and need for energy will have increased considerably by the 1980's and will intensify international competition for sources of energy and other natural resources. Middle East oil will continue to be of great importance to Western Europe, Japan and the US.

Population growth will affect international relationships through the impact of increased population on economic development. Occurrences of famines in certain parts of the world from insufficient food production or distribution are likely to be severe in the 1980's.

Most nations will have developed more explicit environ mental policies during the 1980's which may influence regional and international relations. The developing nations can be expected to step up efforts to gain political and economic leverage in return for their cooperation on environmental issues.

The role of international institutions in affecting future events will depend increasingly on the degree of cooperation between the developing countries and the major powers. The UN probably will endure despite the growth of international institutions.

# Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5 S E C R F T

### USSR and Eastern Europe

The Soviets will strive in the 1980's to maintain strategic superpower parity, and superiority in some areas; avoid confrontations which carry risks of nuclear war; and, undercut Western and Chinese influence where possible, especially in the developing countries. The Soviets will press to prevent further US-China accommodation. The Soviet economy is expected to be fairly stagnant during the 1980's and will lag behind Japan and Western Europe. The Soviets will continue efforts to gain advanced technology and cooperate with other nations in the development of their natural resources.

The Soviets will continue to negotiate with the US on further arms limitations and cooperate with the US in the prevention of nuclear proliferation. They may seek to replace the Warsaw Pact with a Moscow-dominated Council of European Security. A likely alternative to NATO may be the evolution of a West European military alliance with a nuclear deterrention the 1980's.

Eastern Europe will continue to be dominated by the Soviets. Growing contacts and economic relations with the West may stimulate increased nationalism and pressure for reform.

With respect to military weapons, the Soviets may develop highly accurate ICBMs with immediate pre-launch

Maria Bara and Baragaria

# Approved For Release 200/1021 @A-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

retargeting capability and with maneuverable re-entry vehicles and a mobile ICBM. They will probably develop energy-beam weapons.

Unless there is a major reversal of all or several alliances or a discontinuance of Soviet detente with the West, the probability of war between the USSR and NATO Europe should decline. However, the chances of major powers being drawn into regional conflicts are expected to be greater than they are today. Moreover, as developing nations acquire nuclear weapons, the potential for regional conflicts will increase.

### China

China can be expected to play an increasing role in international affairs and become more active in UN activities as well as in the developing nations. Although China will continue to be highly agricultural with a vast population, she will become more of an economic and industrial power.

Relations with the US will continue to improve.

Although the Taiwan issue is not threatening at the present time, China may gain control of Taiwan in the 1980's.

Relations with the USSR will remain tense as China grows stronger.

The Chinese will become increasing concerned about Japan's spreading political influence and economic strength. Serious

# Approved For Release 250470/28 CA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

disputes could occur between Japan and China over rights to oil reserves on the Continental Shelf. Any major political disputes between China and Japan might contribute to a decision by Japan to expand its military capability.

### Western Europe

The political instability of Turkey, Greece, Spain and Portugal will continue into the 1980's. The Italian government easily could be dominated by the Italian Communist Party. Western Europe, including Italy and Portugal, will attain improved economic integration.

European NATO countries will have a greater voice in affairs of the Alliance, though one or more countries probably will leave NATO. NATO can be expected to be replaced by a successor organization. Nevertheless progress is likely toward integration of military forces including French Forces.

W. Germany will continue to maintain large military forces and will insist on participating in any West European nuclear deterrent.

France will not encourage increased European political integration. In implementing policies with Eastern Europe, France will work both bilaterally and through international organizations and conferences. France and the UK are likely to cooperate in providing for a West European nuclear deterrent.

# SECRET

### Middle East

The Arab-Israeli confrontation will continue, and oil will become increasingly important in the 1980's.

Israel will almost certainly have a nuclear capability in the early 1980's. Nationalist governments may replace monarchies in several Arab countries, possibly leading to a more unified Arab position vis-a-vis Israel. Some Arab States will increasingly recognize and tolerate as well as establish economic relations with Israel. While the US and USSR influence will remain high in the region, certain West European countries, Japan, and China will become more influential in the Middle East.

The Persian Gulf area will be a focal point for conflict. Possibilities include Iran which may become nonaligned and any Gulf state likely to be hostile to Iran. A breakup of Jordan could involve several Arab States in a crisis. West European countries and Japan will be affected greatly in any conflict, but probably unwilling to become involved militarily.

China's involvement on behalf of the radical Arab
States is likely to increase. Soviet involvement probably
will be important but indirect.

Berking in the best was the installer of the control of the day of the control of the filter of the

# Approved For Release 2001/10/28 CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

### Japan/Korea

Japan is likely to become dominant economically in Southeast Asia and in much of the Pacific. In foreign affairs, Japan is developing more equal status in relationships with the US. This trend is expected to continue but be very dependent on energy supplies from the Mid East and possibly China. It is likely that Japan's increasing independence from the US will result in the development of extensive economic arrangements with China and the USSR. However, frictions are bound to increase over competition for limited natural resources including oil, particularly with China.

By the mid-1980's Japan may decide to increase greatly its military capabilities if US defense guarantees are not sufficient. A Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons would cause an extensive national debate.

A prime objective governing relations between the Kore is will be the continued improvement in relations between the USSR and China with the US. In this situation there should continue to be limited support from both China and the USSR for an invasion by North Korea. As a result, both Koreas may be able to work together to create a background for expanding areas of economic agreement. The rival regimes increasingly may come to a pragmatic realization that they only stand to lose by fighting each other, and so begin to concentrate on economic and political cooperation.

#### SF(PFT Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

### South and Southeast Asia

India will continue to consolidate its position of regional control while striving also to improve relations with China. Chinese efforts to influence Pakistan or move into Burma would receive strong opposition from India. From a position of increasing strength relative to its neighbors, India may be tempted to undertake intervention or expansion. Even if successful militarily, economic growth will be hindered. Internally, India will have severe population growth and food problems but will survive as the political structure becomes more centralized.

India probably will have a limited nuclear arsenal in the 1980's.

The Indian Ocean will continue to be important by virtue of its location and competing major power interests. It is important because of the several narrow access entrances to the ocean. Interference with the free flow of commerce would have serious implications for Japan, the nations of Western Europe, and for the US. In the 1980's there is likely to be a further extension of Soviet and Chinese influence into the area, which could have an impact on international relationships in the area.

While Southeast Asia may experience economic growth accelerated by Japanese investment, it probably will remain

politically unstable. China's influence is expected to expand. Among the Southeast Asian nations there will be a continuing move toward political accommodation with China, as well as toward increasing economic relations with Japan.

Increasing economic and internal political problems of the Philippines could cause a shift to a pro-Chinese socialist government in the 1980's. Indonesia will probably try to increase its influence and assume more of a leadership role.

### Latin America

Increased nationalism and military activism could provide opportunities for extremist elements to gain control of some political institutions and possibly of one or two countries. Regimes of both right and left orientation can be expected to become increasingly autocratic. Brazil and Mexico appear to have the brightest economic prospects for growth, with Venezuela continuing to be important because of its oil reserves. Nations will increase diplomatic and economic contacts with the USSR, European Communist countries and China.

Brazil will approach major power status; rapid economic growth is predicted, with increased ties to Europe and Japan. Brazil and Argentina will probably have modest nuclear capabilities by 1990.

# Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

Although there is the possibility of conflicts in Latin America, it is unlikely that the US or USSR will become involved in regional hostilities there. These conflicts could range from an inability of the US to successfully renegotiate a new Panama Canal Treaty to longstanding territorial disputes between Argentina and Chile, Bolivia and Chile, Ecuador and Peru, Guyana and Venezuela and between Colombia and Venezuela over oil, as well as their border.

### Africa South of the Sahara

Africa South of the Sahara will be turbulent. There will be frequent changes in governments as nationalistic elements of developing nations compete for power positions. Widespread violence may develop in Rhodesia and South Africa in the 1980's due to black political movements. Whatever political entity evolves will have a tenuous existence and will be under severe internal and international pressures. The USSR and China will probably increase their activities in the region in order to exert influence on the developing countries. In eastern and southern Africa increased stability may result from confederations of states. Nigeria will continue to be a major force.

Africa could become a strategically important source of natural resources and with proper organization (i.e., the

# Approved For Release 2004/10/28 :- CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

organization of mineral cartels) could exert rapid upward pressure on mineral prices. There will be severe famines due to decreasing food consumption per capita stimulated by increased population.

### 1980-90 PERSPECTIVE BY SUBJECT

### Socioeconomic

Socioeconomic factors are expected to become more important in world dynamics in the 1980's. Competition is bound to increase for natural resources including energy and food. Shortages in food will lead to periodic famines and in some cases megafamines (10 to 50 million). The developing nations increasingly will exert international pressure at the expense of the developed nations for improved standards.

The availability and distribution of food will be a major source of tension in Asia and Africa during the 1980's. A predicted drop in the average mean northern hemisphere temperature, local droughts, lack of fresh water, inability to widely apply agrotechnology, and shortages of fertilizers will result in severe worldwide food shortages. Food shortages will induce mass migrations from submarginal to marginal land and conflicts over arable lands. Disagreements between rich and poor nations will increase as the competition for food intensifies.

# Approved For Release 2014/10/28: CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

World population is expected to grow well into the next century, regardless of what is done even now. The present rate of world population growth, slightly below 2 percent per year, is unprecedented. It was not until about 1830 that the world's population reached 1 billion. The second billion was added in about 100 years, by 1930; the third billion in 30 years, by 1960; the fourth billion in 15 years, by 1975. If growth should continue at the present 2 percent annual rate, the world's population would double to 8 billion by 2010.

A major characteristic of present rates of world population growth is the great disparity between the industrialized countries and the developing countries.

Of the world's present 4 billion people, 72 percent live in the developing countries, while only 28 percent live in developed countries with low population growth rates. In addition, the highest population growth rates occur in those regions with the lowest per capita food production.

High rates of population growth will place an added burden on already limited social and economic development in developing countries. It will place heavy pressures on educational facilities, employment opportunities, and food supplies. These conditions in turn impose increased burden on social and administrative services which will further increase instability and unrest in developing countries.

Developed countries increasingly will lose economic bargaining power to natural resource and energy exporting countries. There probably will be periodic interruptions of international resource flows that could seriously erode the global economic situation.

The Soviet Union and China will continue to be self-sufficient in energy. Through 1990, Western Europe and Japan will be highly dependent on the Middle East as an energy source. The US will probably be able to supply a substantial amount of its own energy during the 1980's, but it will be ill-equipped to supply Western Europe and Japan in the event of emergency.

By the mid-1980;s, if the anticipated global natural resource and energy shortages materialize, the developed countries may well experience a severe economic collapse and loss of world leadership. The application of current energy R&D in the 1980's is expected to ease the energy shortage somewhat, however. There are no easy solutions to the anticipated natural resource shortages. Limited conflicts may well develop over mineral shortages.

The multinational corporations (MNC's) will be powerful major forces in global economics in the 1980's.

The MNC's may become increasingly important in managing the

Salaha Marangan

# Approved For Release 2004/10/28 ; CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

interdependent relationships between resource availability, technology for exploitation, and the international political environment. However, they will be increasingly affected by host countries which will continue to demand more concessions in the 1980's. Nevertheless the MNC's will continue to dominate the natural resource markets of the world in the 1980's. The MNC's in the 1980's may be looked upon to manage the resource supplies of the world and act to minimize the conflicts their policies may generate among the governments of developed and developing nations.

The increasing world inflation rates of the past will probably accelerate during the 1980's. In this period prices of natural resources will escalate rapidly. There will be keen competition for natural resources and critical shortages in the 1980's.

# Political

The USSR will continue its expansionist foreign policy in the 1980's, therefore dealings with the US will be marked by continuing attempts to tilt the balance of influence and power. Detente between the US and the USSR, as well as between the US and China, will probably exist, as it will be seen to be mutually advantageous. US ties with Europe will be weakened and NATO will probably be replaced by another defense structure by 1990. China and the USSR will

probably maintain their ideological differences but are not expected to have serious armed conflict. Japan will probably try to attain friendly relations with the USSR and China and will become a key economic influence in the area.

The US and USSR will continue to seek a power balance and the destructive power of weapons will exercise an inhibiting influence upon major war. There will continue to be improvements in existing weapons systems and emphasis on technology as a source of new weapons.

Japan and China increasingly will compete for major influence in East Asia. Continued access to energy and other natural resources are essential to Japan's power in the area. Access to oil from the China Sea or other supplies will be needed by Japan to soften the impact of almost total dependence on Arab oil.

Brazil has large quantities of natural resources and is technologically advanced. Brazil is adjacent to major offshore oil possibilities. Its main strength will be in mineral resources. If climatological forecasts come true, world cooling will shift prime temperature zones toward the equator, increasing Brazil's arable acreage. Japan may increasingly view Brazil a powerful ally who has much to gain from Japan's technology and capital in exchange for oil and mineral resources.

The factor of the contraction of the contraction of the second of the contraction of the

# Approved For Release 2004/10/28 :- CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

There is some indication, based on population, steel production, and energy output forecasts, that China must be considered as a world power of increasing dominance during the 1980's.

Terrorist activity is expected to continue and become more frequent in the 1980's. Nuclear devices and chemical incapacitants could be within grasp of terrorists. By the 1980's, terrorist activities increasingly will become a major international security responsibility.

Control of the seabeds will be an increasing political problem in the 1980's. Growing demands will be placed on the ocean as a source of food. Development of offshore oil and gas reserves will accelerate. Initial exploitation of minerals on a commercial scale is projected for the mid-1980's. These activities will place increased pressure on nations to avoid conflicts arising from competing interests.

There will be a stronger focus of interest in bioengineering in the 1980's. Developments are expected to
provide more precise and accurate understanding, prediction,
and control of individual and group behavior. There will be
advances in the understanding and control over neurophysiological and brain functions. Significant improvements in
human intellectual and physical performance may emerge.

# Approved For Release 2004/40/28: QIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

## Military/Technical

As long as arms limitation agreements deal with only certain types of weapons sytems, increased emphasis is expected to be given by the USSR to technologies relating to new systems as well as to improving the quality of existing systems whose numbers have been limited.

The following Soviet weapons and capabilities are probable for the eighties: nuclear weapons in orbit, pure fusion weapons, space-based missile interceptors, new ASW capabilities, a satellite-borne laser weapon, a mobile ICBM. increased automation of military command and control systems, non-nuclear kill of satellites, and laser detection of submarines and anti-SLBM capabilities.

Soviet leadership will continue to place greater emphasis on science and technology than any other subject regarding future plans, and goals for the USSR. Many of the top leaders (i.e., currently nine of the sixteen voting members of the Politburo) will have S&T backgrounds. These leaders probably will continue to view the attainment of preeminence in science and technology as essential to the ultimate triumph of socialism on a world scale.

Nuclear proliferation will almost certainly be of major concern in the 1980's. In addition to Israel, Brazil

policies i consideratione escriptival proprieta de la consideration de la consideration de la consideration de

# Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5 ${\sf SECRFT}$

and India there are at least five more candidates which could have a nuclear capability by 1990.

Worldwide communication networks are expected to create new social interactions and economic interdependencies in the 1980's. Nations will become much more dependent on these networks. The increased communication capability will probably revolutionize the development patterns of emerging nations by increasingly placing knowledge within easy reach of every nation and community.

The quantitative growth of information will continue into the 1980's. Capabilities will be available for the mass production and establishment of powerful automated information systems on a large scale. In the 1980's the degree of automation of information will approach a hundred times that of today. Automated systems and networks will ensure nearly one-half of all information transfers. The 1980's will be inevitably a period of rapid and radical change, since a host of technological innovations will make desirable and economically feasible the automation of information on a massive scale.

While it is difficult to evaluate all the consequences resulting from these changes, their impact will certainly be felt strongly in the essential fields of education,

andron to the project of a profit of the angle of the profit of the profit of the profit of the contract of th

# Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5 **SECRET**

culture, health, medicine, sicence in general; this impact will be overwhelming in relation to organization and management of national and international activities.

### PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN THE 1980'S

#### WORLDWIDE

- Increasing competition and economic pressures resulting from limited natural resources, energy and food.
- Population growth affecting world power relationships. Increasing occurrences of mass starvation.
- Severe pressures for social changes and innovations in weapons and technology.
- Major powers being drawn into regional conflicts. No third world war.
- Major power centers declining in relation to developing power centers.
- Nuclear proliferation occurring and affecting international power relationships.

# USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

- Avoidance of major power confrontations.
- Replacing Western and Chinese influence where possible
- e Continuing negotiations on arms limitations.
- Continuing attempts to undercut both China in the developing countries and US-China accommodation.
- Development of improved ICBMs and new mobile launching platforms.

#### CHINA

- Elevation of China as a major power center.
- Improved relations with the US.

## Approved For Release 2004/10/28; CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

# Approved For Release 2004/10/28: CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

- China increasingly will gain control of Taiwan.
- Decreasing chances of a war with the USSR.
   Continued ideological split.
- Developing disputes with Japan over rights to the Continental Shelf.

#### WESTERN EUROPE

- Domination of Italian government by the Italian Communist Party.
- Fragmentation and replacement of NATO.
- Cooperation of France and the UK to provide a West European nuclear deterrent.

#### MIDDLE EAST

- Continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- Nonalignment of Iran.
- Conflicts between Iran and Iraq, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. A possible breakup of Jordan.
- Acquisition by Israel of a nuclear capability.

## JAPAN/KOREA

- o Domination by Japan of the area.
- Japanese development of economic arrangements with China and the USSR.
- Increasing Japanese military capabilities; a debate on "going nuclear" will develop.
- Concentration by the two Koreas on economic growth; improving chances of peaceful coexistence.

# SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

- Strengthening of regional control by India.
- Development of a small nuclear arsenal by India.
- Political instability in Southeast Asia; movement toward political accommodation with China.

# Approved For Release 2004/19/23 CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

### LATIN AMERICA

- Increasing growth for Brazil and Mexico.
- Increasing diplomatic and economic contacts with the USSR and China.
- Development of a modest nuclear capability by Brazil and Argentina.

#### AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

- Continued turbulence.
- Increasing Soviet and Chinese activities.
- Emergence as an important source of natural resources.
- Development of a nuclear capability by South Africa.

### SOCIOECONOMIC

- More frequent periods of natural resources and food shortages.
- Mass starvations in Africa and Asia.
- Competition for resources leading to international friction.
- Multinational corporations growing and becoming increasingly involved in international politics.

#### POLITICAL

- China as a world force increasing dramatically.
- Continuing confrontations based on ideological differences and divided national states.
- Emerging new forms of terrorism.

## MILITARY/TECHNOLOGY

• An accumulating disenchantment with progress "for the sake of progress."

# Approved For Release 2004/19/28 GIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

- Expansion of the nuclear community to include: Japan, West Germany, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, Iran, Israel and Sweden.
- Progress in agreements to limit military forces and the introduction of new concepts in weaponry.
- The following weapons possibilities may become realities: weapons in orbit, new concepts in ballistic missile defense including space-based interceptors and advanced ASW.
- Monitoring, manipulation or disruption by hostile nations or terrorists of vital global communications services.

# POSSIBLE BUT UNPREDICTABLE TURNING POINTS

The following turning points possess some probability of occurrence before 1990. Obviously, some of them are more likely to occur than others. They are all unpredictable as to the time of occurrence. All of them are considered important for the world's future.

- china and USSR settle differences and become allies.
- Achievement of what is regarded as first-strike capability by any major power.
- e Revival of intense cold war.
- Dissolution of US-Japanese Alliance.
- Termination of US-Korean Mutual Defense Treaty.
- Successful revolution in China, USSR, Japan, in a major West European nation, or in a Communist East European nation. Portugal may be a near-term example; Spain next.
- Establishment of unified Communist Korea.
- c Coming to power of fanatical regime in USSR or China.

# Approved For Release 2004/10/28 CHA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

- Collapse of Indonesia or India.
- European integration.
- Creation of a European Defense Community.
- Breakup of NATO.
- Establishment of a comprehensive arms control agreement among major powers.
- Rejection of arms control agreement or treaty by major power.
- Establishment of a comprehensive agreement on the use of the seabed.
- Development and deployment of a practical laser ABM weapon system.
- Development and deployment of an effective non-acoustic ASW sensor system.
- Development of nuclear weapons by Brazil, Israel and others or the acquisition of nuclear weapons by certain countries.
- Withdrawal of US Forces from W. Germany.
- Acquisition by the USSR or China of basing facilities in Latin America.
- Use of nuclear weapons by any nation.
- Overthrow of the white regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia by black Africans.
- Increase in terrorism including nuclear blackmail.
- Nuclear accident.
- Arab-Israeli conflict.
- Severe global energy shortage.
- Development of large-scale economical solar energy sources.

# Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5 **SEC**RET

- Rapid global communications; unilateral decisions between nations.
- An environmental disaster or sudden recognition of impending disaster possibly from pollution of the atmosphere or the oceans. Earthquakes.
- Development of cheap methods of producing fresh water.
- Deliberate destruction of the space satellite of one nation by another nation.

# Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5 **SECRET**

#### REFERENCES

- Anderla, Georges, Information in 1985, OECD, 1973.
- Bell, Daniel, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, Basic Books, Inc., N.Y., 1973.
- Brown, Lester R., By Bread Alone, Praeger, 1974.
- Drucker, Peter F., "Multinationals and Developing Countries: Myths and Realities," 53, 1, October 1974.
- Falk, Richard A., A Study of Future Worlds, Free Press,
- Gray, Colin S., "Predicting Arms Race Behavior", Futures, 6, 5, October 1974.
- Hahn, Walter and Kenneth Gordon, Eds., Assessing the Future and Policy Planning, Gordon and Breach, 1975.
- Jenkins, Brian, "International Terrorism: A Balance Sheet,'
  Survival, The International Institute for Strategic
  Studies, July/August 1975.

25X1

25X1

Joint Long-Range Strategic Study 1985-1994 (JLRSS 85-94), SM-535-74, 24 October 1974.

25X1

- Kahn, Herman, The World, 1983-1991, 1-11-1619/2-RR, 9 June 1972
- Kahn, Herman and B. Bruce-Briggs, "Things to Come: Thinking About the Seventies and Eighties," McMillan, N.Y., 1972.
- Klatt, W., "Asia After the World Food Conference,"
  International Affairs, 51 3, July 1975.
- Overholt, William II., Forecast For 1994: Revisions For A Long-Range Projection, 1-11-1926-P, 21 January 1974.

25¥1

र्षातुक्कानी रेट कर्न जिल्ली केंद्र अरोग है। जातन के अरोग के तक कर कर कर कर है। इस के अरोग

# Approved For Release 2004/10/28; @IA-RDP80M01133A000800090007-5

25X1

- Remy, Richard C. and James A. Nathan, "The Future of Political Systems", Futures, 6, 6, December 1974.
- Somit, Albert, Political Science and the Study of the Future, The Dryden Press, 1974.
- Spekke, Andrew A., The Next 25 Years: Crisis and Opportunity. World Future Society, Washington, D.C., 1975.
- Stefflre, Volvey, "Long-Term Forecasting and The Problem of Large-Scale Wars", Futures, 6, 4, August 1974.
- Toffler, Alvin, The Eco-Spasm Report, Bantam Book, 1974.
- Venu, S., "The Multinationals and Developing Societies: A Profile of the Future," <u>Futures</u>, <u>6</u>, 2, April 1974.